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Introduction

It is widely accepted among climate scientists that human-induced climate change is occurring. Yet the debate over what, if anything, should be done about the problem continues
on multiple fronts. The debate is underscored by the question of how society should balance the (certain) economic costs associated with containing the problem today with the
(uncertain) socioeconomic benefits obtained in the future (Hansen, et al., 2006; Nordhaus,
2007; Stern, 2007). Nordhaus (2007) argues that an optimal policy (or set of policies) will
involve modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions
in the medium and long terms. He calls this approach the “climate-policy ramp,” in which
policies to slow climate change increasingly tighten over time. To the contrary, the Stern
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Review (2007) and Gore (2007) propose drastically lower discount rates than those used in
the Nordhaus (2007) study, which in turn magnify climate-change impacts in the distant
future and sanction deeper cuts in emissions today.1
It is also unclear which policies might be the most effective in controlling carbon emissions. The practicality of taxes versus permits (Pizer, 1997; Kaplow, 2010), adoption of
cleaner technologies, and, of particular interest in the context of this paper, the potential for
carbon sequestration in soils and forests continue to be assessed (USGS, 2011; Feng et al.,
2004). Further, while developing-nation participation in the global control effort is generally
considered to be a necessary condition for successful mitigation of climate change, there is
also continued debate over the extent to which developing nations should be required to
participate in this effort (Rose et al., 1998; Cooper, 1998). And there is noticeable reticence
on the part of some developed and developing nations concerning their perceived roles in
any future global agreement (Batabyal, 1997 and 2000; Benchekroun and Long 2012; Long
2015).
This paper contributes to the debate by investigating the joint role carbon sequestration
and international permit trading might play in inducing developing (henceforth Southern)
nations to participate in a global effort to mitigate climate change. Our objective is to
demonstrate exactly how international trade in carbon permits can induce the participation
of Southern nations by harnessing their potential to sequester carbon in a manner that
enhances not only their welfare, but also that of the developed (henceforth Northern) nations
(see also Benitez et al., 2007, and Sohngen and Sedjo, 2004). At the outset, we note that this
paper does not address other carbon reduction strategies such as subsidized adoption of clean
technology or implementation of a carbon tax. Rather, we address the question of whether,
1

Nordhaus’ (2007) Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) proposes an optimal
policy that would first reduce global carbon emissions by 15 percent in the initial years, increasing to 25
percent by 2050, and 45 percent by 2100. This translates into a global temperature rise relative to the year
1900 of 2.8◦ C by 2100 and 3.4◦ C in 2200, with corresponding global abatement costs of $2.2 trillion (and
global net benefit of roughly $1.2 trillion). In contrast, the Gore (2007) and Stern Review (2007) studies
call for emissions reductions of 85– 90 percent below current levels by 2050. Based on the DICE model, this
translates into global net costs of $17 trillion to $22 trillion relative to no controls.
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and under what circumstances, a dynamic comparative advantage in carbon sequestration
alone provides a strong-enough incentive for Southern nations to join in a global permit
market with Northern nations, where the possibility exists for the South to export carbon
permits to the North in exchange for imported finished goods.2
There is in fact considerable evidence to suggest that Southern nations enjoy a comparative advantage in carbon sequestration. For instance, Conant (2010) and Keane et al. (2010)
discusses how Southern nations’ comparative advantage in sequestration arises through grasslands management and cleaner production in agricultural products, respectively. Benitez et
al. (2007) estimate global sequestration supply curves for afforestation and reforestation activities based on highly disaggregated (grid-level) physical data with country-level controls
for political, financial, and economic risks. They find that low-cost sequestration sites are
located mainly in Southern regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeastern Brazil, and
Southeast Asia.
Our main theoretical innovation in this paper is the development of a dynamic game
in a general-equilibrium context of carbon sequestration in conjunction with international
trade in carbon permits and finished goods. We consider a two-region world (North vs.
South) in which labor in each region may be used to produce a composite finished good
for consumption that emits carbon as a by-product, or may instead be used for carbon
sequestration. We make a distinction between the flow of carbon emissions and the global
carbon stock. The latter is assumed to affect economic welfare in each region. In the context
of a differential game between the North and South, we characterize the properties of a
2

Myriad differences across nations can drive comparative advantages associated with carbon sequestration. For example, differences in monitoring and enforcement capability across nations can easily distort
an equilibrium carbon price that would otherwise accurately reflect extant comparative advantages in the
production of carbon sequestration and finished goods. Distortions wrought by existing region-specific regulations placed on localized pollutants, or localized non-convexities associated with damages incurred via
the global carbon stock itself (e.g., uncertain tipping points in regional damage functions), could similarly
detract from a region’s welfare gains otherwise obtained through exploitation of its respective comparative
advantage in sequestration or production of finished goods. Incorporating these additional types of heterogeneity in our model would complicate the analysis and cloud our understanding of the extent to which joint
implementation of carbon sequestration and permit trading can lead to mutual welfare gains in the context
of a basic international trade model.
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corresponding Nash equilibrium, both in terms of the carbon stock’s time path and its steadystate level. We derive the conditions under which the South has a dynamic comparative
advantage in carbon sequestration. We show that an international permit market coupled
with carbon sequestration is mutually welfare improving, and that international trade in the
finished good and carbon permits lowers the global stock of carbon.
Although our results are founded upon relatively complex dynamic analyses, our main
message is both simple and compelling. The South retains an incentive to participate in
a global permit market given its comparative advantage in carbon sequestration. Thus,
enlistment of developing nations in a global effort to control climate change relies at least in
part on substantiating the merits of carbon sequestration in conjunction with a global permit
market. This paper rigorously characterizes the merits associated with joint implementation
of these two control mechanisms.
In this sense, our paper is related to branches of literature dealing with international environmental agreements, e.g., Caplan et al. (2003), which considers the role of carbon trading
in an efficient equilibrium within the context of a United Nations’ protocol, De Zeeuw (2008),
which studies the optimal size of such agreements, and Pavlova and De Zeeuw (2013), which
incorporates national asymmetries in environmental benefits and damages. The paer is also
related to Porter (1990) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), which consider the effects of
environmental regulation on technological change and the dynamics of competition. Further,
Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that technical progress directed toward a clean intermediate
good sector is optimal in terms of long-term growth in the presence of optimal environmental
regulation (see also Hemous, 2016, and Bijgaart, 2017).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out a basic dynamic model of
production and emissions under autarky. Section 3 then extends the analysis to allow for
the possibility of carbon sequestration. Section 4 further extends the model to allow for
international trade. Concluding comments are provided in Section 5.
4
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A Basic Model of Emissions and Production

To begin we develop a simple dynamic model of an autarkic global economy in the absence of
carbon sequestration. We assume a Ricardian Northern region (region 1) and Southern region
(region 2), each with their own production sectors, where the respective fully-employed labor
forces are constant proportions of constant populations. The regional production functions
are given by:
Yj (t) = αj LYj (t) j = 1, 2

(1)

where Yj and LYj are production and production-sector employment levels, respectively, in
period t and region j, and the αj > 0 are respective productivity constants. Each region’s
production results in carbon emissions as a by-product. For simplicity, assume that region
j’s emissions per unit of output are fixed, i.e:

ej (t) =

Yj (t)
βj

j = 1, 2

(2)

where the ej > 0 are period t emission levels and the βj > 0 are emissions-productivity
constants.3
Let Wj denote region j’s welfare level, which takes the form:

Wj (t) = uj (Cj (t)) − fj (E(t)) j = 1, 2

(3)

where Cj , and E are region j’s aggregate consumption level and the global carbon stock at
time t, respectively. The first term in region j’s welfare function represents utility obtained
3

This Ricardian production function is equivalent to a Leontief production function Y (t) =
min{αLY (t), βe(t)} (see Beladi and Oladi, 2011, and Beladi et al., 2013). As alluded to in Section 1,
this type of simplifying technology assumption, along with those to follow concerning the carbon stock’s
constant rate of decay and deterministic regional sequestration productivities and damages associated with
the carbon stock, enable us to retain a focus on the role of carbon sequestration in the determination of a
trading equilibrium. Interestingly, potential problems associated with asymmetric information across regions
are effectively muted in this model due to the endogeneity of the regional permit-allocation mechanisms and
free trade in both the carbon and finished-good sectors, as well as the assumption of two regions.
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via consumption of the finished good, while the second term represents aggregate economic
damage associated with the global stock of carbon.4 Both uj and fj are continuous and
twice differentiable. We also assume that u0j (.) > 0 and u00j (.) ≤ 0, ∀Cj > 0, fj0 (.) > 0
and fj00 (.) > 0, ∀E > 0, and limE→∞ fj0 (E) = ∞. Except where necessary, we henceforth
suppress time indicator t for notational simplicity. The global carbon stock evolves through
time according to:
Ė =

2
X

ej − σE

(4)

j=1

where σ is a constant natural rate of decay (i.e, atmospheric assimilation) of the global
carbon stock.
Let L̄j represent region j’s constant labor supply. Thus, given full employment in each
region we have Yj = αj L̄j . It follows from equation (2) that ej = αj L̄j /βj in each period.
Thus, the steady-state, equilibrium global carbon stock is given by:

E

=

j=1 ej

σ

αj
j=1 βj L̄j

P2

P2
ss

=

σ

.

(5)

At an autarky equilibrium we have Cj = Yj , implying that region j’s steady-state welfare
P
level is given by Wjss = uj (αj L̄j ) − fj ( 2i=1 αβii L̄i /σ).5

3

Carbon Sequestration Under Autarky

Our next task is to extend the simple autarky model to incorporate the possibility of carbon
sequestration in each region. We maintain that the regional economies are closed in this
section, an assumption that is relaxed in due course. Let region j’s sequestration production
4

As is common in the literature, we assume separability of utility from consumption and disutility from
the carbon stock for purposes of tractability.
5
Given the carbon stock’s initial level, E(0), we can readily determine the stock’s time path by solving
the differential equation (4): E = [Σ2j=1 αj L̄j /βj ]/σ + A exp[−σt] where A = E(0) − [Σ2j=1 αj L̄j /βj ]/σ. It
then follows that in general Wj = uj (αj L̄j ) − fj ([Σ2j=1 αj L̄j /βj ]/σ + A exp[−σt]).

6

function be given by:
Sj = Sj (LSj ) j = 1, 2

(6)

where Sj and LSj are the levels of carbon sequestration and labor employed in sequestration
by region j’s government, respectively, i.e., we assume carbon sequestration is a public sector
activity. We further assume that Sj is continuous, with Sj (0) = 0, Sj0 (.) > 0, and Sj00 (.) < 0.
Note that in contrast with the finished good sector, sequestration technology is not necessarily Ricardian. There is an implicit unpaid fixed factor in addition to labor (e.g., a rainforest)
used in the production of carbon sequestration that engenders diminishing returns. Regional
divergence in sequestration’s marginal product of labor can arise in three different ways – via
the endowment of the fixed factor, the technology itself, or the allocation of labor to managing the fixed resource. Function Sj (.) meets the Inada condition if limLS →0 S 0 (LS ) = ∞.6
The law of motion for the global carbon stock is accordingly modified as:

Ė =

2
X
j=1

ej −

2
X

Sj (LSj ) − σE.

(7)

j=1

Consistent with our earlier characterization of welfare, we further assume that region j’s
government sells emission permits to its production sector at zero profit, i.e.,

wj LSj = ij ej

j = 1, 2

(8)

where wj and ij are the equilibrium wage rate and permit price, respectively, in region j. As
a public sector, the profit motive need not apply.
The full-employment condition in each region is given by:

LYj + LSj = L̄j

6

j = 1, 2

We require this condition to subsequently guarantee the existence of a steady-state equilibrium.
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(9)

and market clearing in the finished good market can be written as:

Cj = αj [L̄j − LSj ] j = 1, 2.

(10)

The control variables for regional government j’s problem are LSj and ej . Substituting out
ej , the problem for region j = 1, 2 reduces to:7
Z

∞

[uj (αj [L̄j − LSj ]) − fj (E)] exp[−rt]dt

(11)

2
2
X
X
S
s.t. Ė =
(αj /βj )[L̄j − Lj ] −
Sj (LSj ) − σE

(12)

max
LS
j

0

j=1

j=1

E(0) ≥ 0.

(13)

The problem’s corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is given by:
"
Hj = [uj (αj [L̄j − LS ]) − fj (E)] + λj

#
2
2
X
X
(αj /βj )
[L̄j − LSj ] −
Sj (LSj ) − σE .
j=1

(14)

j=1

To both simplify our analysis and for the sake of mathematical tractability we henceforth
assume u1 (.) = u2 (.) = u(.), f1 (.) = f2 (.) = f (.), α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β and
L̄1 = L̄2 = L̄. These conditions also permit us to focus attention on the role of carbon
sequestration in our model; a role that is motivated by differences between the North’s and
South’s sequestration production functions. First-order conditions corresponding to (14) can
therefore be written as:

0


α
0
S
+ Sj (Lj ) = 0
β

(15)

λ̇j = f 0 (E) + λj [σ + r]

(16)



αu (.) + λj

along with equations (12) and (13) and transversality condition limt→∞ λj E = 0. For future
7

Since our focus is on carbon sequestration, the scope of strategic interaction between the two regions
is limited to sequestration and emission levels. This approach is similar to that employed in Long’s (1992)
pollution control game.
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reference note that (15) implies λj < 0. Further, total differentiation of (15) results in
∂LSj /∂λj < 0.
An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the autarky game, denoted (L̂S1 (t), L̂S2 (t)), is a solution to the above control problems for regions 1 and 2.8 We similarly denote the autarky
equilibrium production (consumption) and carbon stock paths as Ŷ1 (t), Ŷ2 (t), and Ê(t), respectively. Our next task is to fully characterize these paths, beginning with our first lemma,
which is a direct consequence of the previously mentioned simplifying assumptions.
Lemma 1. λ̂1 (t) = λ̂2 (t) for all t.
Proof. Recall that Ê(t) is our autarky equilibrium path for the global carbon stock (therefore
common to both regions). The dynamics of the co-state variables must satisfy (16), which
clearly has the same steady-state equilibrium solution for each region. Note also that λj (0) =
∂wj /∂E(0) = −f 0 (E(0)), j = 1, 2 according to the maximum principle and our interpretation
of model’s co-state variables.
We now make an explicit assumption concerning the marginal productivities of carbon
sequestration. Let us assume that S20 (LS ) > S10 (LS ) for any LS > 0. This regional difference
could obviously arise because the South has superior sequestration technology, but this is
not necessarily what we have in mind. Instead, we assume its larger marginal sequestration
productivity arises because the South has a larger endowment of the fixed factor in carbon
sequestration (e.g., the rainforest in South America – the lungs of the planet – or a rela8

To the extent that sustainability of global environmental agreements in general, and those targeting
mitigation of climate change in particular, require relatively strong precommitment (or self-enforcement)
among participants, an open-loop equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept for our problem (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Long, 1992, 2010). This is especially the case since both
our autarky and trade games are premised on the assumption of self-enforcement to begin with. In the case
of the autarky game, the underlying regional Nash equilibria obtained in each period reflect an inherently
deterministic, pure strategy space within which the regions essentially ignore the other region’s strategies. In
the case of the trade game, our framework assumes each region similarly ignores exogenous moves by nature,
the possibility of mixed strategies by its rival, and possible deviations by its rival from its equilibrium
strategy. The role of self-enforcement in global environmental agreements is addressed in Barrett (1994),
which shows that self-enforcement does little to improve upon the Nash outcome when the number of regions
that share the resource is large. Caplan et al. (2003) also explore the issue of self-enforcement in the context
of the Kyoto Protocol.
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tively large, open arable land mass in Africa). This assumption enables us to draw a clear
comparison between the North’s and South’s equilibrium paths.
Proposition 1. Given S20 (LS ) > S10 (LS ) for any LS > 0, then at any autarky equilibrium
and any time t we have (i) L̂S1 (t) < L̂S2 (t), which implies Ŝ1 (t) < Ŝ2 (t), and (ii) Ŷ1 (t) > Ŷ2 (t).
Proof. It follows from equation (15) and Lemma 1 that:
u0 (C1 (t))
1/β +

S10 (LS
1 (t))
α

=

u0 (C2 (t))
1/β +

S20 (LS
2 (t))
α

(17)

Note that our autarky assumption and market clearing conditions in each region imply
Ĉj (t) = Ŷj (t), j = 1, 2. It also follows from our setup that LS1 (t) < LS2 (t) if and only if
Y1 (t) > Y2 (t). Therefore, given market clearing, LS1 (t) < LS2 (t) if and only if C1 (t) > C2 (t).
To prove our results assume the negation, i.e., at equilibrium L̂S1 (t) ≥ L̂S2 (t), which implies
Ĉ2 (t) ≥ Ĉ1 (t). This in turn implies u0 (Ĉ2 (t)) ≤ u0 (Ĉ1 (t)). Therefore, for equation (17)
to hold we must have S10 (L̂S1 (t)) ≥ S20 (L̂S2 (t)) implying L̂S2 (t) ≥ L̂S1 (t) by our maintained
assumption of diminishing marginal productivity (i.e. Sj00 (.) < 0, j = 1, 2), which is a
contradiction. Therefore, L̂S1 (t) < L̂S2 (t), which implies Ŝ1 (t) < Ŝ2 (t) and Ŷ1 (t) > Ŷ2 (t).

Proposition 1 shows us that even under autarky regions implicitly capitalize on their
respective comparative advantages. In particular, the South produces relatively more carbon
sequestration than that produced by what would otherwise be its trading partner in a world
with free trade, the North.
Next, we characterize the autarky equilibrium’s steady-state. Let LSj = φj (E) represent
the LSj –E locus along which λ̇j = 0 for j = 1, 2. Similarly, LSj = ξj (E), j = 1, 2, represents
the locus along which Ė = 0. The following lemma characterizes these two functions:
Lemma 2. (i) φj (E), j = 1, 2, is strictly increasing in E, and (ii) ξj (E), j = 1, 2, is strictly
decreasing in E.
10

Proof. Rewrite (15) as:
λj = −

u0 (.)
1
β

+

Sj0 (.)
α

.

(18)

Substitute (18) into (16) and set λ̇j = 0, j = 1, 2, to obtain:
"

#
0
S
S
(L
)
1
j
j
f 0 (.)
+
− (σ + r) u0 (.) = 0 j = 1, 2.
β
α

(19)

Totally differentiating (19) with respect to LSj and E, applying the previously mentioned
curvature conditions on f (.), Sj (.), and u(.), and rearranging we obtain:
00

φ0j (E) = −

αf (.)

h

1
β

+

Sj0 (.)
α

i

f 0 (.)Sj00 (.) + α2 (σ + r) u00 (.)

> 0 j = 1, 2.

(20)

Similarly, let Ė = 0 in (12) and totally differentiate with respect to LSj and E to obtain:
ξj0 (E) =

α
β

−σ
< 0 j = 1, 2.
+ Sj0 (.)

(21)

We now turn to the existence of a steady-state autarky equilibrium. The following proposition addresses a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium.
Local and global stability conditions for this equilibrium are derived in the technical appendix.
Proposition 2. Given the Inada conditions on Sj , j = 1, 2, there exists a unique steady-state
autarky equilibrium at which the carbon sequestration level for each region is positive.
Proof. Given Lemma 2, in order to establish the existence of a steady-state autarky equilibrium at which each region’s sequestration level and the global carbon stock are positive, it suffices to show that ξj (0) > φj (0), j = 1, 2. From equation (19), which implicitly defines φj (.),
j = 1, 2, we see that f 0 (E) = α (σ + r) u0 (.)/[α/β +S 0 (LS )]. Recall that f 0 (E) → 0 as E → 0.
Thus, it must also be the case that α (σ + r) u0 (α[L̄ − LSj ])/[α/β + Sj0 (LSj )] → 0 as E → 0.
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Given the Inada conditions on Sj , this occurs iff LSj → 0. Therefore, limE→0 φj (E) = 0,
j = 1, 2, since φj is monotonically increasing in E by Lemma 1, implying that φj (E) is an
injective function. Next, it follows from the definition of ξj (.) (Ė = 0 via equation 12), that
P
P
limE→0 [ j ej − j Sj (·)] → 0. Given ej > 0, j = 1, 2, this implies LSj > 0, j = 1, 2. Since
ξj is monotonically decreasing in LSj , j = 1, 2 from Lemma 1 it is also an injective function.
Together these conditions imply that ξj (0) > φj (0), j = 1, 2. Uniqueness of the steady-state
autarky equilibrium follows directly from Lemma 2.
The geometry for the autarky steady-state equilibrium is presented in Figure 1, which
depicts the equilibrium outcome in terms of sequestration labor levels in both the North and
South and the global carbon stock. The equilibrium for region j = 1, 2 is represented by the
intersection of functions φj and ξj , labeled point(s) a.
While we have maintained that both regions have identical labor endowments, it is instructive to consider the effects of a change in the endowment of labor in either of the
two regions. The following proposition addresses the effects of such a change in region j’s
endowment.
Proposition 3. The autarky equilibrium levels of carbon sequestration and consumption of
the finished good in region j = 1, 2 are each positively related to region j’s labor endowment,
while the steady-state level of region k’s sequestration (consumption), k = 1, 2, k 6= j, falls
(rises). Moreover, the global carbon stock falls with increases in region j’s labor endowment.
Proof. Without loss of generality let dL̄2 > 0 and dL̄1 = 0. By total differentiation of the
first-order conditions, we obtain:


 S 
 S
α
dE
α
dL2
dL1
α
0
0
+ S2 (.)
+
+ S1 (.)
+σ
=
β
β
β
dL̄2
dL̄2
dL̄2


S
00
dL
f (.)
β
dE
Ω2 2 +
1 + S20 (.)
= αβu002 (.)
σ+r
α
dL̄2
dL̄2


dLS1
f 00 (.)
β 0
dE
Ω1
+
1 + S1 (.)
=0
σ+r
α
dL̄2
dL̄2
12

(22)
(23)
(24)

LS1
ξ10 (E) ξ1 (E)

φ1 (E)

LS1
LS1

a
b

E

E0 E
ξ2 (E)
ξ20 (E)

LS2

LS2

a

0

b
φ2 (E)

φ02 (E)

LS2
Figure 1: Autarky steady-state equilibrium and the effects of a labor endowment increase in
the south.
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where Ωj = (β/α)f 0 (.)Sj00 (.)/ (σ + r) + αβu00j (.) < 0, j = 1, 2. By solving the above system
of equations, we obtain:
"



2 ! 00 #
1
α
α
f
dLS2
=
αβσΩ1 u002 (.) − β 2 Ω1
+ S20 (.) + u002 (.)
+ S10 (.)
> 0 (25)
|H|
β
β
σ+r
dL̄2


 00
1
dLS1
f 0 S200 (.)
α
f
0
00
=
βS2 (.)u2 (.) −
+ S1 (.)
R 0 (26)
|H|
α(σ + r)
β
σ+r
dL̄2


dE
αΩ1 f 0 S200 (.)
00
0
− βS2 (.)u2 (.) R 0 (27)
=
|H|
α
dL̄2
where |H| = σΩ1 Ω2 −

β
α

 
2
2  00

f
α
α
0
0
Ω1 β + S2 (.) + Ω2 β + S1 (.)
> 0. Thus, dLS2 /dL̄2 > 0,
σ+r

while the signs of dLS1 /dL̄2 and dE/dL̄2 are (apparently) ambiguous. Lastly, note that
dLS2 /dL̄2 < 1, which implies that dLY2 /dL̄2 > 0, indicating that dY2 /dL̄2 > 0. Thus, we
conclude that dC2 /dL̄2 > 0.
Considering our problem from a different perspective sheds additional light on the ambiguous effects represented by equations (26) and (27). By totally differentiating φ1 (i.e.,
equation (15) after substituting for the steady-state level of λ1 from (16)), it is straightforward to show that dLS1 /dL̄2 = 0 at equilibrium. That is, φ1 in Figure 1 does not shift
in a local neighborhood of the initial equilibrium. However, totally differentiating ξ1 (i.e.,
equation (7) when Ė = 0) results in:
dLS1
S 0 (.) dLS2
= −α 2 0
.
+ S1 (.) dL̄2
dL̄2
β
This implies that at the initial equilibrium dLS1 /dL̄2 < 0 since we have already established
from equation (25) that dLS2 /dL̄2 > 0. Collectively these results imply that both LS1 and E
decrease at the new steady-state equilibrium (see Figure 1). Reduction in LS1 also implies
that consumption of the finished good in region 1 increases.

The effects of an expansion in region 2’s labor endowment are depicted in Figure 1, where
the upper (lower) panel depicts the resulting effects in region 1(2). An increase in region 2’s
14

labor endowment shifts φ2 upward to, say, φ02 , while ξ2 also shifts upward to ξ20 . The new
steady-state equilibrium is identified as point b. Region 2’s steady-state carbon sequestration
level therefore increases. While φ1 does not shift for region 1 in the figure’s upper panel,
ξ1 shifts downward as established by the proof of Proposition 3. Consequently, LS1 and the
global carbon stock E both fall.
Intuitively, with wages adjusting in equilibrium to ensure full employment of labor in each
region, region 2’s expanded labor force is drawn into production of both the finished good
and carbon sequestration. As for region 1, our result depicts a classic case of free-riding
behavior since this region reduces its labor allocation to carbon sequestration. However,
region 1’s free-riding behavior is not strong enough to offset region 2’s direct effect on E due
to region 2’s increased allocation of labor to sequestration. As a result, E decreases.
Finally, it is of interest to explore the effects of a change in a given region’s sequestration
productivity on the autarky steady-state equilibrium. As in the previous analysis, we assume
all other aspects for these two regions are the same. The following proposition formally states
the implications of such a change.
Proposition 4. An increase in region j’s carbon sequestration productivity has ambiguous
effects on region j’s steady-state sequestration and finished-good production levels, but leads
to a reduction in the equilibrium global carbon stock. Moreover, the increase in region j’s
sequestration productivity leads to a decrease (increase) region k’s, k 6= j, level of carbon
sequestration (finished-good consumption).
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, and without loss of generality, assume region 2
experiences an exogenous increase in carbon sequestration productivity. We start by parameterizing S2 (.) as S2 (LS2 ; δ2 ) where ∂S2 /∂δ2 > 0 and

∂ 2 S2
∂LS
2 ∂δ2

> 0, thus isolating the marginal

effect on sequestration productivity. We then have:






 2

dLS2
β
∂S2 ∂S2
βf 00
α
∂S1
∂ S2
00 α
0
=
Ω1 f
+
−f
+
− σΩ1
R 0(28)
dδ2
α(σ + r)|H|
β
α(σ + r) β
∂LS2 ∂δ2
∂LS1
∂LS2 ∂δ2
∂S1
00 

 2

β( αβ + ∂L
S )f
dLS1
∂S2 β f 0
α
∂S2
∂ S2
1
=
Ω2
−
+
< 0(29)
dδ2
α(σ + r)|H|
∂δ2
ασ+r β
∂LS2 ∂LS2 ∂δ2
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∂ S2
∂S2
dE
−Ω1
βf 0 (.)
α
∂S2
− Ω2
=
< 0(30)
+
dδ2
|H| α(σ + r) β
∂δ2
∂LS2 ∂LS2 ∂δ2

where |H| and Ωj , j = 1, 2 are defined as in the preceding proposition proofs. Evidently,
dLS1 /dδ2 < 0 and dE/dδ2 < 0, while the sign of dLS2 /dδ2 is indeterminate.

Ambiguity in the direction of change in the level of region 2’s carbon sequestration (and
thus finished-good consumption) stems from the fact that given a small (large) enough β (σ)
value an increase in its sequestration productivity may enable region 2 to reduce LS2 and still
achieve a corresponding reduction in E (see (12) with Ė = 0).9 Thus, region 2 is capable
of capitalizing on its innovation in sequestration productivity by balancing its response –
shifting some of its labor resource to production of the finished good – while still inducing a
decrease in the global carbon stock in the face of region 1’s free-riding response.
Developing nations differ in terms of their relative carbon sequestration productivities,
hence in addition to illustrating the effect of a technological change in sequestration the
above proposition also relates to patterns of comparative advantage. At any given ratio
of carbon sequestration to finished-good consumption, a region with a higher marginal sequestration productivity must have a lower opportunity cost of sequestration in an autarky
equilibrium. The proposition has further policy implications. It suggests, for example, that
in an autarkic setting transfers of, or investment in, sequestration technologies in the South
could be effective in reducing the global carbon stock while at the same time enhancing the
South’s production of the finished good. In other words, enhancing the South’s carbon sequestration productivity could be a “win-win” in terms of improving the global environment
and increasing the South’s standard-of-living.
Before explicitly incorporating international trade in carbon permits and the finished
goods into our model we draw an important relationship between the price side of our
9

It can similarly be shown that an increase in finished-good productivity has an ambiguous effect on both
carbon sequestration and finished-good consumption levels, as well as on the global carbon stock.
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autarkic model and its quantity side.10 Denote the relative permit price by τj = ij /pj , j =
1, 2. The following proposition formally addresses this relationship.
Proposition 5. There exists a one-to-one relationship between the relative carbon permit
price and employment in carbon sequestration in region j = 1, 2, at any time t, given by

τj = 1/ 1/β + Sj0 (LSj )/α .
Proof. A competitive market for the final good requires that the final good price at any time
t be given by:
pj =

wj ij
+
α
β

j = 1, 2

implying that wj = α(pj − ij /β). This implies from the labor market equilibrium and labor
mobility that:
ij Sj0 (LSj ) = wj = α(pj − ij /β) j = 1, 2
which in turn implies the result.

4

International Trade in Carbon Permits

The final step in our analysis is to modify our autarky model to incorporate the possibility of
international trade in both the finished good and in carbon permits. We restrict our analysis
to the case of free international trade. Throughout the remainder of the paper we maintain
that the sole difference between the North and South is higher marginal sequestration productivity in the South for any given input level. As highlighted in the following proposition,
this difference is sufficient to guarantee that the South (North) has a comparative advantage
in carbon sequestration (the finished good) at any given point in time.
Proposition 6. Let S10 (LS ) < S20 (LS ), ∀LS > 0. Then, the South (North) has comparative
advantage in carbon sequestration(the finished good) at any time t.
10

We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this relationship.

17

Proof. It directly follows from Proposition 5 that τ̂1 (t) > τ̂2 (t), ∀t, implying that the South
South (North) has comparative advantage in carbon sequestration (the finished good) at any
time t.

Following the standard theory of trade the South is therefore a net exporter (importer)
of carbon permits (the finished good) to (from) the North. In turn, region j’s consumption
level is given by Cj (t) = Yj (t) + mj (t), ∀t, j = 1, 2, where mj (t) is the quantity of trade
in the finished good by region j = 1, 2. Note that m1 (t) < 0 and m2 (t) > 0, indicating
that the North (South) is a net exporter (importer) of the finished good. Furthermore,
net emissions in each region (i.e, carbon emissions net of trade in permits) is given by
ej (t) − xj (t) = α(L̄ − LSj (t))/β, where xj (t) is region j’s quantity of trade in permits. Since
the South (North) is a net exporter (importer) of carbon permits, we have x1 < 0 and
x2 > 0.11 Finally, the global market-clearing conditions for the finished good and permit
markets as well as the trade-balance condition for each country require that, respectively:

m1 (t) + m2 (t) = 0

(31)

x1 (t) + x2 (t) = 0

(32)

mj (t) = τ (t)xj (t) j = 1, 2

(33)

where τ is the relative world price of carbon. It follows from equation (31) and (32) that
m1 = −m2 ≡ m and x1 = −x2 ≡ x. Substituting these expressions into (33) and noting
the implicit dependence of τ on LSj , j = 1, 2, we can rewrite (33) most succinctly as m =
Λ(LSj ) = τ (LSj )x(LSj ), j = 1, 2. This specification captures the essence of the effect of a
region’s choice of carbon sequestration on the permit market. Subject to (13), region j’s
11

Note that, in contrast to the finished good, exports of carbon permits are defined to be positive, while
imports are defined to be negative. For example, if the South exports one carbon permit to the North, then
the South’s carbon emissions must fall by one unit, implying that LS2 (t)(LS1 (t)) must increase (decrease) by
α/β. It is also worth noting that the total quantity of permits allocated is both implicit and endogenously
determined in the context of this model’s permit market (see Caplan and Silva, 2005, and Caplan, 2006, for
early examples of this approach).
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current-value Hamiltonian as it engages in free trade can be written as:

Hj = [u (Yj + mj ) − f (E)] + λ

2
X
j=1

ej −

2
X

!
Sj (LSj ) − σE

,

(34)

j=1

resulting in region j’s first order conditions,





α
dmj d(Λ)
0
S
0
+ Sj (Lj ) = 0
− α u (.) − λj
d(Λ) dLSj
β

(35)

λ̇j = f 0 (E) + λj (σ + r)

(36)

as well as equations (13) and the global carbon stock law of motion. The transversality
condition is again given by limt→∞ λj (t)E(t) = 0, j = 1, 2. Further, from (36) we note that
in the steady state λj < 0, j = 1, 2.
As in the preceding section, we start with some characterizations of the free-trade equilibrium path before turning to a characterization of the steady-state. The following proposition
draws a comparison between the autarky and free-trade equilibrium paths for both the North
and South. Recall that a circumflex denotes autarky values. Let a tilde denote the corresponding free-trade values.
Proposition 7. Assume that S10 (LS ) < S20 (LS ), ∀LS > 0. Then for all t > t(0): (i)
S̃1 (t) < Ŝ1 (t) < Ŝ2 (t) < S̃2 (t), and (ii) Ỹ1 (t) > Ŷ1 (t) > Ŷ2 (t) > Ỹ2 (t).
Proof. Begin by noting that the second inequalities in both (i) and (ii) follow directly from
Proposition 1. Thus, we need only verify the first and last inequalities in (i) and (ii).
(i) Since τ̂2 (t) < τ (t) < τ̂1 (t) for any t along the equilibrium path. It follows from
Proposition 5 that α/S20 (L̂S2 (t)) < α/S20 (L̃S2 (t)), implying S20 (L̃S2 (t)) < S20 (L̂S2 (t)). This,
along with the diminishing marginal sequestration productivity, implies L̃S2 (t) > L̂S2 (t),
∀t > t(0). Similarly, it can be shown that L̂S1 (t) > L̃S1 (t), ∀t > t(0). Thus, we have
L̃S1 (t) < L̂S1 (t) < L̂S2 (t) < L̃S2 (t), ∀t > t(0). Therefore, it follows from positive marginal
sequestration productivity that S̃1 (t) < Ŝ1 (t) < Ŝ2 (t) < S̃2 (t).
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(ii) Since we have established that L̃S1 (t) < L̂S1 (t) < L̂S2 (t) < L̃S2 (t), ∀t > t(0), it follows
from equation (9) that L̃Y1 (t) > L̂Y1 (t) > L̂Y2 (t) > L̃Y2 (t), ∀t > t(0), implying that
Ỹ1 (t) > Ŷ1 (t) > Ŷ2 (t) > Ỹ2 (t), ∀t > t(0).

This proposition indicates that the regions will indeed exploit their respective comparative advantages in moving from an autarkic to a free-trade equilibrium. In particular, the
North reallocates its resources to produce relatively more of the finished good, while the
South reallocates toward the production of carbon sequestration.
Next we consider the effect of trade in goods and carbon permits on the global carbon
stock. While at any point in time both regional governments choose their optimal sequestration and thus emission levels, it is not entirely obvious what happens when both regions
engage in trade. In the following proposition we address the effects of trade liberalization in
the finished good and carbon permit markets on the global carbon stock by considering a
small departure from an autarkic equilibrium at any point in time.
Proposition 8. Let S10 (LS ) < S20 (LS ), ∀LS > 0. A sufficiently small departure from an
autarky equilibrium by the regions at any time t in response to the opening of trade reduces
the global carbon stock at that time as well as at the steady-state trading equilibrium.
Proof. Let the North and South liberalize slightly from the autarky equilibrium at time t.
To show the effect on E, differentiate the carbon stock law of motion and simplify to obtain:

α
dĖ + σdE(t) = − dLS1 + dLS2 − α
β



dLS1
dLS2
+
τ̂1 (1) τ̂2 (1)


(37)

Note from Proposition 7 that dLS1 < 0 and dLS2 > 0. Now, as we consider sufficiently
small changes, let dLS2 = −dLS1 = ε > 0. It then follows from equation (37) that dE ≈
α(ε/τ̂1 − ε/τ̂2 )/σ < 0, where the inequality follows directly from the proof of Proposition 6.
In the steady-state equilibrium the equality is strict, i.e., dE = α (ε/τ̂1 − ε/τ̂2 ) /σ < 0.
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In other words, as the regions incrementally adjust their labor allocations to exploit their
respective comparative advantages in response to the opening of free trade, the resulting
allocations reflect the greater degree of specialization that occurs as a result. Given the
simplifying assumptions adopted in Section 3, these adjustments in turn lead to a reduction
in the global carbon stock as the world economy opens up for trade. The result is intuitive.
Since production technologies are assumed identical across regions, the production (including
its relocation) effect on the carbon stock is outweighed by increased sequestration under the
free trade regime. Of course if production technology is sufficiently dirtier in the North than
in the South, the former effect could outweigh the latter. In this case the carbon stock would
increase.
As in the preceding section, we next address the existence and uniqueness of the global
economy’s steady-state free-trade equilibrium. Global stability conditions for this equilibrium are derived in the technical appendix.
Let LSj = φ̃j (E) be the LSj –E locus along which λ̇ = 0 and LSj = ξ˜j (E) be the locus along
which Ė = 0 for region j = 1, 2. The following lemmas characterize ξ˜j and φ̃j , j = 1, 2.
Lemma 3. (i) ξ˜j (0) > 0 and ξ˜j−1 (0) > 0 for j = 1, 2, and (ii) ξ˜j (E), j = 1, 2, is monotonically decreasing and convex in E.
Proof.

P
(i) Using equation (6) it is straightforward to verify that ξ˜j−1 (0) = 2j=1 ej /σ −

Sk (LS
k)
σ

= α(LYk + L̄)/(βσ) + Sk (LSk ) > 0, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. It also follows from the
P
P
carbon stock law of motion that 2j=1 ej − 2j=1 Sj (LSj ) = 0 if Ė = E = 0. This in
P
turn implies that Sj (LSj ) = 2j=1 ej − Sk (LSk ) > 0, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. However, the
inequality is true iff LSj > 0, therefore ξ˜j (0) > 0, j = 1, 2.
(ii) Set Ė = 0 in global carbon stock law of motion, totally differentiate the resulting
equation, and rearrange to obtain:

ξ˜j0 (E) =

α
β
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−σ
< 0.
+ Sj0 (.)

(38)

To verify the convexity of ξ˜j (E), differentiate (38) with respect to E to obtain ξ˜j00 (E) =
−σ 2 Sj00 (.)
(α/β+Sj0 (.))3

> 0, j = 1, 2.

The following lemma likewise addresses some important properties of φ̃j , j = 1, 2.
Lemma 4. Let u(.) and Sj (.) satisfy their respective Inada conditions. Then, (i) φ̃−1
j (0) = 0
as LSj −→ 0, (ii) limE→∞ φ̃j (E) = L̄j , and (iii) φ̃0j (E) > 0 if σ and r are sufficiently small.
Proof. By setting λ̇j = 0 in (36) and using equation (35) we obtain:





dm d(Λ)
f 0 (E) α
S
0
0
− α u (.) +
+ Sj (Lj ) = 0.
d(Λ) dLSj
σ+r β

(39)

(i) Recall that limLSj →0 Sj0 (LSj ) = ∞. Thus, the second bracketed term in (39) approaches
infinity as LSj → 0. Since limLSj →0

dΛ
dLS
j

is finite, for equation (39) to hold, we must have

f 0 (E) = 0 as LS → 0, which is true if and only if E = 0, implying φ̃−1
j (0) = 0.
(ii) Note that as E → ∞ the second term in (39) approaches +∞ via our maintained
assumptions on f (.). Therefore, for (39) to hold as E → ∞ we must have the equation’s
first expression simultaneously approach −∞ as E → ∞. In order for (39) to hold,
the first bracketed expression must be negative at a steady-state equilibrium, implying
that we must have u0 (.) → ∞, which in turn implies C → 0. However, this would
be the case if and only if LYj = m = 0, that is, LSj = L̄j . Thus, we conclude that
limE→∞ φ̃j (E) = L̄j .
(iii) Totally differentiating (39) and rearranging we obtain:
h
φ̃0j (E)

=−

α
β

+

i

Sj0 (LSj )

f 00 (.)

Ψj

where:

Ψj = (σ + r)∆j u00 (.) + (σ + r)Ωj u0 (.) + f 0 (.)Sj00 (.)
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(40)

∆j = ([dm/dΛ][dΛ/dLSj ] − α)2 > 0
Ωj = [d2 m/dΛ2 ][dΛ/dLSj ]2 + [dm/dΛ][d2 Λ/dLS2
j ]

The numerator of (40) is positive. The first and third terms of Ψj are negative while the
second term is ambiguous. However, the first and last terms will dominate the second
term for sufficiently small σ and r. Thus, φ̃0j (E) > 0 if the carbon stock naturally
decays at a sufficiently slow rate.

We now turn to the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state free-trade equilibrium.
The following proposition addresses the question of existence under the condition that the
South is a net importer (exporter) of the finished good (carbon permits) as stated formally
in Proposition 9.12
Proposition 9. Assume that u(.) and Sj (.), j = 1, 2, meet their respective Inada conditions.
Then there exists a steady-state free-trade equilibrium in which the South’s carbon sequestration level is positive given that it is a net importer (exporter) of the finished good (carbon
permits). Moreover, the equilibrium is unique for sufficiently small σ and r.
Proof. At a steady-state equilibrium we have LSj = φ̃j (ξ˜j−1 (LSj )), j = 1, 2. Part (i) of Lemma
3 as well as parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4 guarantee the existence of an equilibrium (i.e., a
fixed point of the composite function φ̃j (ξ˜j−1 (.))) at which region j’s sequestration level is
positive. Moreover, part (ii) of Lemma 3 and part (iii) of Lemma 4 ensure that such a fixed
point is unique for sufficiently small σ and r.
In addition to illustrating the properties of the autarky equilibrium, we can think of point
a in Figure 1 as depicting our unique, free-trade, steady-state equilibrium (replacing φ with
12

Note that the lack of a more general uniqueness property for the free-trade equilibrium is consistent with
static, neoclassical trade models. If instead we assume a small, open Southern economy, the international
relative price of a carbon permit is determined exogenously. It would then follow that ∆j = α2 , Ωj = 0, and
Ψj < 0 in equation (40), implying φ̃0j (E) > 0, ∀σ ∈ (0, 1). This ensures a unique steady-state equilibrium for
any σ.
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˜ when σ and r are sufficiently small. Recall that a higher σ implies that
φ̃ and ξ with ξ)
carbon sequestration is less valuable. At the extreme, if σ = 1, then carbon emissions are
completely absorbed by nature, thus rendering sequestration irrelevant. The requirement of
a smaller discount rate implies that future outcomes are more important. Thus, if neither
of these requirements is met, then carbon permit market may be irrelevant.
As a final observation, evidently both regions benefit from this trading arrangement when
compared with the status quo of no carbon sequestration and international permit trading,
assuming that our earlier assumption guaranteeing a Southern comparative advantage in
sequestration is met (see Proposition 6). This conclusion follows directly from the solution
to our dynamic optimization problem. Assume that the condition of Proposition 6 is met,
resulting in Southern comparative advantage in carbon sequestration. It follows that at the
outset of trade the relative carbon price is lower in the South than in the North. Therefore,
under free trade the South imports (exports) the finished good (carbon permits) and through
classic gains from trade experiences an increase in welfare. Higher welfare for both regions
in this equilibrium follows from the fact that a zero time path for carbon sequestration (i.e.,
LSj (t) = 0, j = 1, 2∀t) is technically feasible for both the autarky and the free-trade scenarios
in both regions.
However, in both scenarios the optimal paths are instead characterized by positive levels
of carbon sequestration. This implies, by the definition of optimality, that regional welfare
is improved (for both regions) with carbon sequestration under both free trade and autarky.
Free trade further enhances the South’s welfare through the gains-from-trade pathway. In
essence, there are two sources of gain. On the one hand, optimizing emission levels (i.e.,
internalizing environmental externalities) leads to welfare improvement. On the other hand,
both regions enjoy the classical gains from trade. We thus have the following formal corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that S10 (LS ) < S20 (LS ), ∀LS > 0. Then there exists a global system
of carbon sequestration and carbon permit trading under which welfare for both North and
South improves.
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Hence, compared to a global economy with neither global cap-and-trade nor a market for
carbon sequestration (the current status quo), there are two sources of gains for the South.
One is due to an improvement in the domestic trade-off between consumption of the finished
good and its contribution to environmental damage (i.e., the South benefits directly from
increased carbon sequestration). Another results from engaging in trade with the North by
exporting carbon permits and importing the finished good. Of course the important point
is that the existence of a global permit market makes it in the developing region’s interest
to increase its sequestration and trade carbon permits.
One might ask, given this result, why are Southern regions typically opposed to international environmental treaties such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)? One reason could be that these agreements often involve a multitude of articles
addressing various aspects of global carbon emission management, aspects of which may
be objectionable to developing nations. Our model is designed to address a more specific
question. If an international carbon permit market is put in place, would developing nations
have an incentive to participate all else equal? Our theory suggests that the answer is yes,
and illustrates the mechanism for why.

5

Conclusions

We construct a dynamic game between Northern (developed) and Southern (developing)
regions within a general-equilibrium framework. We show how the South may develop a
dynamic comparative advantage in the production of carbon sequestration and thereby engender an inherent incentive to join with the North in a global carbon trading market. In
particular, we characterize the equilibrium path as well as the steady-state equilibrium under
both autarky and free trade, and derive the underlying conditions for the South’s dynamic
comparative advantage in sequestration.
Importantly, we show that under free trade – where the South exports carbon permits –
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the global carbon stock falls relative to autarky, without requiring an explicit, exogeneous
global carbon cap. Moreover, given a standard set of assumptions, a unique steady-state
free-trade equilibrium exists where the South exports carbon permits and imports finished
goods, provided that the natural rate of decay (i.e., atmospheric assimilation) of carbon is
sufficiently slow. Both the North and the South experience increases in regional welfare
relative to autarky and the absence of carbon sequestration. In the context of our model,
the policy implication is that no other enticements (e.g., foreign aid, etc.) would be required
to induce Southern cooperation in the fight against climate change. Needless to say, the
formation of such a global carbon permit market may also lead to further socially desirable
outcomes, such as protection of other endangered natural resources (e.g., tropical rainforests,
marginal agricultural lands, etc.).13
We have tried to maintain a balance between tractability and realism in deriving our
analytical results. The model we present captures the essential elements of the joint carbon sequestration and carbon permit market problem. However, it is generally the case in
economic dynamics that relatively strong assumptions must be imposed when pursuing an
analytical solution, and the model presented in this paper is no exception. The analysis
could be extended, for example, by incorporating tariffs or adding capital accumulation to
the model. Several of the model’s more restrictive assumptions, such as identical finished
good technologies, emissions productivities, and welfare functions, could also be relaxed in
extended versions of our basic model. Relaxing these these assumptions would evince the
sensitivity of our results in more realistic settings. Of course the trade-offs associated with
these adjustments is that as extra dimensions are added to our dynamical system we would
need to appeal to computational and numerical analyses as necessary supplements to our
underlying conceptual model.

13

Furthermore, by having created a market for the global externality with endogenously determined initial
permit allocations, the model’s free-trade equilibrium results in full internalization of the damages associated
with the global carbon stock, and is therefore Pareto efficient.
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Technical Appendix
To determine the local stability properties of the system of differential equations (7) and (16)
in Section 3 at the steady-state equilibrium, we evaluate the determinant of the system’s
Jacobian matrix (J) taking into account

J=

−σ

∂LS
j
∂λj

−

h

< 0 from (15),

α
β

0

+ S (.)

00

f (.)

i ∂LS
j

∂λj

< 0.

σ+r

|J| < 0 denotes saddle-point stability. The same Jacobian matrix results for the system of
equations (36) and the carbon stock law of motion in Section 4. However, in this case the
expression for

∂LS
j
∂λj

(derived through total differentiation of (35)) is:
α
+ S 0 (.)
∂LSj
β
=
0 (.)
∂λj
S 00 (.)
∆u00 (.) + Ωu0 (.) + fσ+r

where Ω and ∆ are defined as in the proof of Lemma 4. A sufficient condition for

(41)
∂LSs
∂λs

<0

entails sufficiently small σ and r. This in turn would similarly imply |J| < 0.
To test for global stability of the systems in both Sections 3 and 4, respectively, we use
Brock and Scheinkman’s (1976) positive definiteness test, where:
2

|Q| =

− ∂∂EH2

r
2

r
2

∂2H
∂λ2j

>0

(42)

implies global stability. Considering first the autarky case of Section 3, we differentiate (14)
twice with respect to E in order to obtain ∂ 2 H/∂E 2 = −f 00 (E) < 0. Similarly, differentiating
(14) twice with respect to λ and using the envelope theorem we obtain:


∂LSj
∂ 2H
α
0
=−
+ S (LS )
.
∂λ2
β
∂λj

(43)

Recalling that ∂LSj /∂λj < 0 under autarky, we conclude that ∂ 2 H/∂λ2j > 0. These results
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imply that the global stability condition holds for the autarky problem for sufficiently small
r.
Finally, considering the free-trade case of Section 4, the condition on the system’s determinant defined by (42) holds, but only for sufficiently small σ and r, since in this case we
also have ∂ 2 H/∂E 2 = −f 00 (E) < 0 and equations (41) and (43) hold.
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